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THE PUSH TO CRIMINALIZE AGGRESSION:
SOMETHING LOST AMID THE GAINS?
Mark A. Drumbl*
The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression, but the Rome Statute fails to define the crime. A Special Work-
ing Group on the Crime of Aggression, however, has made considerable 
progress in developing a definition.  The consensus that has emerged favors 
a narrow definition. Three characteristics animate this consensus: (1) that 
state action is central to the crime; (2) that acts of aggression involve inter-
state armed conflict; and (3) that criminal responsibility attaches only to 
very top political or military leaders. This Article normatively challenges 
this consensus. I argue that expanding the scope of the crime of aggression 
in terms of both the impugned acts as well as who can be prosecuted could 
carry considerable expressive value. Such an expansion also would better 
reflect the diversity of contemporary threats to stability, security, sovereign-
ty, and human rights interests.  
INTRODUCTION 
Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute provides the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) with jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. In accordance 
with general principles of criminal law, however, the ICC is unable to pros-
ecute anyone for aggression until the crime is precisely defined. The 1998 
Rome Diplomatic Conference failed to reach agreement on a definition of 
aggression for the ICC’s purposes. It also failed to reach agreement on con-
ditions for the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over the crime. Assuredly, ag-
gression is taken to be a crime under customary international law to which 
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ington & Lee University, School of Law. This paper was presented at a symposium at Case 
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Aggression.” I thank all participants in the symposium and subsequent Experts’ Meeting for 
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this paper, I thank John Knox, Hari Osofsky, Kevin Jon Heller, Sonja Starr, Noah Weisbord, 
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individual criminal responsibility attaches.1 However, until the Rome Sta-
tute itself defines the crime, the ICC cannot prosecute it.  
The Rome Statute charts a way forward by permitting an amend-
ment that would define the crime and set out the conditions for the exercise 
of jurisdiction. In this regard, the Rome Statute creates an “opt-in” system 
for jurisdiction over aggression.2 Resolution F of the Final Act of the Rome 
Conference requested that the Preparatory Commission develop proposals 
for a provision on aggression to be presented to the Assembly of States Par-
ties for consideration at a Review Conference.  In 2002, the Assembly of 
States Parties established a Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggres-
sion (Special Working Group). The Special Working Group has industrious-
ly issued a series of discussion papers.
The Review Conference looks like it will take place in 2010. In an-
ticipation, the Chairman of the Special Working Group circulated a Discus-
sion paper in mid-2008 that, in its Annex, proposes a definition of the crime 
of aggression.3 This Discussion paper proposes specific draft amendments 
to the Rome Statute and is without prejudice to the positions of delegations. 
Whereas consensus is emerging within the Special Working Group in terms 
of the definition, consensus remains elusive in terms of the exercise of ju-
1 ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 262–63 (2007); Claus Kress, The Crime of Aggression before the First Review of 
the ICC Statute 3 (monograph dated 2007, on file with the author); R. v. Jones [2006] UKHL 
16, ¶¶ 12, 19, 44, 59, 96, 97, 99 (U.K. House of Lords finding unanimously that aggression is 
a customary international crime notwithstanding the ongoing discussion of the specifics of 
the crime and lack of agreement for the conditions of ICC jurisdictional exercise). There is a 
dearth of law-in-practice, however, regarding actual prosecutions for aggression. M. Cherif 
Bassiouni and Benjamin Ferencz posit that, owing to this dearth, the enforcement of aggres-
sion has fallen into desuetude; accordingly, “it is hard to argue that aggression constitutes a 
crime under international law, either under conventional law or customary law.” M. Cherif 
Bassiouni & Benjamin B. Ferencz, The Crime Against Peace and Aggression: From its Ori-
gins to the ICC, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 45 (3d ed. 2008).  This position is con-
tra to the majority opinion among international law publicists and jurists. 
2 CRYER ET AL., supra note 1, at 275. 
3 Discussion Paper on the Crime of Aggression Proposed by the Chairman (revision June 
2008), Draft Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Annex, 
International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed sixth session, New York 
(2–6 June 2008), ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/2 (14 May 2008) [hereinafter Discussion Paper]. The 
Special Working Group plans to finish its work in the spring of 2009. Anja Seibert-Fohr, The 
Crime of Aggression: Adding a Definition to the Rome Statute of the ICC, ASIL Insight (Vol. 
12, Issue 24, Nov. 18, 2008).  In fact, as this Article went to press in the spring of 2009, the 
Special Working Group issued the report of its final session.  Report of the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression (Seventh session, second resumption, New York, 9-13 
February, 2009), ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2 (February 20, 2009).  The contents of this report 
reflect only minor changes (none of which are germane to this Article) to the contents of the 
2008 Discussion Paper. Conversations regarding the crime of aggression now move to an 
informal inter-sessional meeting to be held in June 2009 and the Review Conference (sche-
duled to be held in Kampala 2010) and preparatory work thereto. 
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risdiction. The 2008 Discussion paper suggests several alternatives for the 
exercise of jurisdiction. The procedure for the entry into force of any 
amendment to the Rome Statute also remains unresolved.  
The definitional consensus that has emerged is grounded on the as-
sumption that a narrow definition of aggression stands a more realistic 
chance of securing state approval. Three characteristics animate this defini-
tional consensus and contribute to its narrowness: (1) that state action is 
central to the crime; (2) that acts of aggression involve interstate armed con-
flict; and (3) that criminal responsibility only attaches to very top political 
or military leaders. The 2008 Discussion paper proposes a new Article 8 bis 
to the Rome Statute that defines the crime of aggression as follows (foot-
notes omitted): 
(1) For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the 
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person effectively 
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and 
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Na-
tions.  
(2) For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use 
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
or political independence of another State, or in any other manner in-
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.  
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in 
accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the 
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however 
temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexa-
tion by the use of force of the territory of another State or part 
thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the ter-
ritory of another State or the use of any weapons by a State 
against the territory of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed 
forces of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or 
air forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the 
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving 
State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the 
agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory 
beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has 
placed at the disposal of another State, to be used by that other 
State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; 
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(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed 
force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the 
acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein.  
The Discussion paper also proposes a new Article 25(3bis) to the Rome 
Statute that provides as follows: “In respect of the crime of aggression, the 
provisions of this article [n.b. Article 25] shall apply only to persons in a 
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or mili-
tary action of a State.”4
Despite the pragmatic attraction and political soundness of proceed-
ing conservatively, however, the opportunity to define the crime of aggres-
sion for the purposes of a permanent international justice institution also 
presents a moment for out-of-the-box thinking. In my remarks, I hope to 
contribute to this thinking by offering a lesson from the past, raising a con-
cern for the present, and asking a question for the future. Principally, I sug-
gest an expansion in the scope of the crime of aggression, both in terms of 
the impugned acts as well as in terms of who can be prosecuted. I draw 
from two examples of crimes against the peace prosecutions in the wake of 
the Second World War that have received scant attention in the Special 
Working Group. I also draw from the nature of contemporary threats to 
transnational stability, security, sovereignty, and human rights interests. In 
my opinion, many of these threats depart from the classic model of inter-
state armed conflict.  
Mine is a normative project. It is not one that is principally con-
cerned with pragmatics. This does not mean, however, that I am oblivious to 
the considerable resources that have been invested in consolidating a con-
sensus regarding the definition of aggression. I recognize that discussions 
regarding the contours of the crime of aggression have occurred off-and-on 
for many decades. The reality is that a narrow understanding of the crime 
seems to be what negotiators want and constitutes shared common ground. 
That said, nothing precludes codification of the pre-existing consensus 
while actors within and/or outside of the Rome Statute framework push, 
either collaterally or subsequently, for the scope of the crime of aggression 
to expand in a manner that more accurately reflects the interests that crimi-
nalization purports to promote as well as the deeply collective nature of the 
crime. The following sequence concerns me: (1) the Special Working Group 
proposes a narrow crime of aggression; (2) the Rome Statute is amended to 
include this narrow crime; (3) the Special Working Group packs up its tent; 
and (4) the conversation about what exactly aggression should proscribe 
simply loses momentum and ends. Such an outcome, which arises from a 
4 Discussion Paper, supra note 3 (footnote omitted). 
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push to codify, might compromise the longer-term expressive value and 
effective legitimacy of the crime of aggression to future generations, espe-
cially in the developing world.   
I. BACKGROUND
The Statutes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military 
Tribunals (IMTs) were the first to criminalize crimes against peace and ag-
gressive war and attribute individual criminal responsibility therefore. Ar-
ticle 6(a) of the Nuremberg IMT Statute (the London Charter, August 8, 
1945) criminalized the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war 
of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accom-
plishment of any of the foregoing.”5 The Allies included this crime in the 
IMT’s jurisdiction despite the fact that, at the time, there was “considerable 
doubt about the customary basis for charges of aggressive war.”6 That said, 
the Nuremberg IMT dismissed the retroactivity argument. It endeavored to 
demonstrate that crimes against the peace had been part of customary inter-
national law prior to 1939.7 The Nuremberg IMT emphasized the pre-
existing nature of the crime as reflecting treaty law that emerged in the 
wake of the First World War, including the Kellogg-Briand Pact.8 The Nu-
remberg IMT went so far as to call aggressive war the “supreme interna-
tional crime.”9 It convicted 12 defendants on charges of conspiracy to wage 
aggressive war (Count I) or crimes against peace (Count II) (8 defendants 
5 Article 5(a) of the Charter for the Tokyo IMT (Jan. 19, 1946) proscribed crimes against 
the peace in a manner that was differently phrased in places but essentially identical to the 
Nuremberg IMT’s provision.   
6 ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 242 (2005). Prior to the London 
Charter, a number of international instruments had referred to aggression as a crime. Some of 
these were not ratified. Others were non-binding “soft law.” The one instrument with the 
greatest normative force was the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which renounced war as an 
instrument of national policy. Kellogg-Briand Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343. The Nu-
remberg IMT judgment referred to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Nuremberg IMT Judgment, 
reproduced at 41 AM. J. INT’L L., 172  (1947) [hereinafter Nuremberg IMT Judgment]. That 
said, the Kellogg-Briand Pact never actually criminalized aggression, nor did it establish 
individual criminal responsibility therefore. Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 6. 
7 See Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra note 6, at 186.  Dissenting Judges Pal and Röling 
at the Tokyo IMT opined that the crime of aggression was not part of international criminal 
law.  
8 The Nuremberg IMT also viewed conspiracy to commit aggressive war as an indepen-
dent crime. In Hamdan v. Rasul, 548 U.S. 557, 608 (2006), Justice Stevens, writing for a 
plurality of the United States Supreme Court, held that conspiracy to commit aggressive war 
constituted an international crime, unlike conspiracy to commit war crimes.  See also Presby-
terian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy Inc., 453 F. Supp. 2d 633, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(citing this point).   
9 Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra note 6, at 186. 
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were convicted of Counts I and II, 4 defendants were acquitted of Count I 
but convicted of Count II).10 The Tokyo IMT convicted 24 defendants of 
Class A offenses (crimes against the peace). 
Although not designed for the major war criminals, Allied Control 
Council Law No. 10 included a very similar definition of crimes against the 
peace than that found in the London Charter. Control Council Law No. 10 
added “invasions” to “war” in the definition of aggression. Several crimes 
against the peace prosecutions occurred under Control Council Law No. 10, 
but in only one case were convictions entered. American Military Tribunals 
conducted the following crimes against peace cases under Control Council 
No. 10: I.G. Farben, Krupp, High Command, and Ministries. A number of 
other Control Council Law No. 10 cases referenced the existence of an ag-
gressive war, but did not actually charge the crime. In I.G. Farben, 24 high-
level industrial officers were charged inter alia with aggressive war. All 
were acquitted because they were found merely to have aided the war effort 
instead of planning and leading it. Krupp involved 12 industrialists. The 
defense filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on insufficient evidence, 
which was granted.  In the High Command case, 14 defendants (13 generals 
and one admiral) were charged with crimes against the peace. One defen-
dant committed suicide during the proceedings, and all of the remaining 
thirteen were acquitted of this charge insofar as they were found not to be 
operating on the policy-making level.11 In the Ministries case, 17 of 21 de-
fendants (high-level officials in the government or Nazi Party) were charged 
with crimes against the peace. The Tribunal initially convicted five and ac-
quitted nine of the 14 defendants who went to trial (the Tribunal earlier had 
dismissed the charges against 3 defendants). Following a request for correc-
10 Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression, Secretariat for the Prepara-
tory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Working Group on the Crime of Ag-
gression 29 (Jan. 24, 2002), PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1 [hereinafter Historical Review of 
Developments Relating to Aggression].    
11 The German High Command Trial, 12 THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N LAW REPORTS 
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1949) [hereinafter The German High Command Trial]. The 
United States Military Tribunal held that criminal responsibility for the waging of an aggres-
sive war is to be confined to policy-makers. Id. at 67. The accused senior officers fell below 
that level. Where to draw the line between guilt and innocence? The United States Military 
Tribunal responded: “Somewhere between the Dictator and Supreme Commander of the 
Military Forces of the nation and the common soldier is the boundary between the criminal 
and the excusable participation in the waging of an aggressive war by an individual engaged 
in it.” Id. In order to convict for aggressive war, there must be proof of actual knowledge that 
an aggressive war is intended and that, if launched, it will be an aggressive war; there also 
must be proof that “the possessor of such knowledge, after he acquires it shall be in a posi-
tion to shape or influence the policy that brings about its initiation or its continuance after 
initiation, either by furthering, or by hindering or preventing it.” Id. at 68. In the German 
High Command trial, eleven defendants were convicted of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and sentenced to terms ranging from two years to life. Id. at 1.    
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tion of any alleged errors of fact or law, the Tribunal reversed two of the 
convictions but affirmed the other three.12  Finally, in the Roechling case in 
the French Zone of Occupation, the Supreme Military Government Court 
overturned the conviction for crimes against the peace that had been entered 
by the General Tribunal. 
Numerous developments have since consolidated the place of ag-
gression in international law. The paragraphs that follow survey some of 
these developments.13
The Charter of the United Nations prohibits acts of aggression and 
empowers the Security Council to determine their existence. Article 1 of 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (a Declaration on the 
Definition of Aggression, December 14, 1974, and adopted by consensus) 
defines aggression as “the use of armed force by a State against the sove-
reignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another state, or in 
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” Ar-
ticle 3 of this Resolution lists some specific examples of what activity could 
constitute aggression. These examples effectively track those in proposed 
Article 8 bis and, in this sense, reflect Article 8 bis’ alignment with Resolu-
tion 3314. The Discussion paper suggests that Resolution 3314, which is 
directly referenced in the text of Article 8 bis(2), be appended in an Annex 
to the Rome Statute itself.14 In Article 4, Resolution 3314 notes that “the 
acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may 
determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the 
[United Nations] Charter.”      
Resolution 3314 eliminates justifications for aggression (art. 5(1)) 
and, in article 5(2), states that: “A war of aggression is a crime against in-
ternational peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility.” 
Article 5(2) underscores the dual nature of aggression—namely, as crime as 
well as delict.  A war of aggression, in which participation triggers individ-
ual criminal responsibility (and, presumably, state responsibility), differs 
from aggression generally, which engages only state responsibility. The use 
of armed force must be of utmost gravity to entail individual criminal re-
sponsibility under international law.15 Nina Jørgensen observes that: “In 
Article 5(2) the General Assembly confirmed a distinction between wars of 
aggression, which were considered to have a criminal status, and other acts 
of aggression short of war. All acts of aggression are international delicts 
12 Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression, supra note 10, at 56. 
13 For a much more comprehensive discussion of these developments, see Bassiouni and 
Ferencz, supra note 1. 
14 Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at explanatory note 8. 
15 U.N. PREP. COMM’N FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION, Proposal Submitted by Germany: The Crime of Aggression: A Further Infor-
mal Discussion Paper, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGCA/DP.4 (Nov. 13, 2000). 
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entailing state responsibility.”16 There also is a third distinction, namely 
between aggression (whether subject to penal responsibility or state respon-
sibility), on the one hand, and the unlawful use of force, on the other. Not 
all instances of the unlawful use of force constitute aggression. According 
to Bassiouni and Ferencz, the Security Council has never relied on Resolu-
tion 3314 to label any armed attack as being tantamount to aggression.17
Contemporary international or internationalized criminal tribunals 
have not prosecuted anyone for aggression. This is unsurprising, in that ag-
gression is not proscribed by the Statutes of the ad hoc criminal tribunals. 
Nor is it included in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the 
Statute of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. Although 
not an international tribunal, one noteworthy exception is the Statute of the 
Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT). This Statute includes aggression, but not as an 
international crime. Aggression is proscribed by Part 5 (entitled “Violations 
of Stipulated Iraqi Laws”), where it is limited under article 14(c) to “[t]he 
abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that may lead to the threat of 
war or the use of the armed forces of Iraq against an Arab country [in ac-
cordance with domestic law].” Aggression charges have yet to be brought 
against any IHT defendants. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), which 
has jurisdiction over disputes between states, has ruled on questions regard-
ing the unlawful use of force. In the Nicaragua case (1986), it held that ar-
ticle 3(g) of the Resolution 3314 definition was declaratory of customary 
international law. In Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo (2005), the ICJ found Uganda responsible for the unlawful use of 
force in the DRC, but did not hold that Uganda’s conduct rose to the level 
of aggression.18
16 NINA H.B. JØRGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 240 
(2000).
17 Bassiouni & Ferencz, supra note 1, at 44–45. 
18 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo  v. 
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 1 (Dec. 19). In this judgment, the ICJ held that Ugandan military activi-
ties in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between August 1998 and June 2003 
constituted unlawful armed activity that violated the principle of non-use of force in interna-
tional relations and the principle of non-intervention, and gravely violated the prohibition on 
the use of force expressed in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. Id. ¶ 165. The ICJ 
also held that Uganda had committed massive violations of international humanitarian law 
and international human rights law. Id. ¶179. The ICJ held that Uganda was obliged to make 
reparation to the DRC for the injury caused. Id. ¶ 259. The ICJ did not adjudicate the DRC’s 
claim that Uganda had committed aggression. See id. The Armed Activities case does not 
provide much clarification about which instances of unlawful use of force actually rise to the 
level of aggression.
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II. LESSONS FROM THE PAST: THE GREISER AND SAKAI PROSECUTIONS
The Special Working Group has extensively considered many of the 
sources of law discussed in Part I, in particular IMT aggressive war prose-
cutions and Control Council Law No. 10 prosecutions in the American and 
French military zones.  These prosecutions constitute the starting point of 
the conversation for the Special Working Group and for the crime of ag-
gression generally. However, other courts and tribunals also adjudged ag-
gression in the wake of the Second World War. Part II takes up two cases 
that led to convictions: Greiser (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland, Poz-
nan, July 1946) and Sakai (Chinese War Crimes Military Tribunal, Nank-
ing, August 1946). These cases have received comparatively little attention 
and are not discussed in the otherwise comprehensive Historical review of 
developments relating to aggression, undertaken by the Secretariat for the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression (January 24, 2002).19 I examine these 
two cases insofar as they offer some insight regarding what crimes against 
the peace/aggression prosecutions might look like (and what they might 
achieve) when they involve perpetrators below the top military or political 
leadership. These judgments pre-date the Nuremberg and Tokyo IMT 
judgments. However, they explicitly or implicitly reference the London and 
Tokyo Charters, along with other international legal instruments, and there-
by underscore the influence of international materials on the substance of 
national proceedings. 
A. Takashi Sakai 
On August 29, 1946, the Chinese War Crimes Military Tribunal of 
the Ministry of National Defense in Nanking convicted Takashi Sakai 
(1887-1946), a lieutenant general in the Imperial Japanese Army, of crimes 
against the peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.20 Sakai was a 
military commander in China during WWII and in the antecedent Japanese-
Chinese conflicts.  He was involved in the brutal conquest of Hong Kong in 
1941 (he also served as Japanese Governor of Hong Kong for a short pe-
riod). The judgment is somewhat unclear whether Sakai’s conviction was 
19 Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression, supra note 10 (analyzing 
the various judgments of the Nuremberg IMT, tribunals established pursuant to Control 
Council No, 10, and the Tokyo IMT, along with activity by the United Nations Security 
Council, United Nations General Assembly, and the International Court of Justice). See also
Historical Review of Developments Relating to Aggression, Annex, Preparatory Commission 
for the International Criminal Court, (18 Jan. 2002)  PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1/Add.1. This 
document also omits discussion of the Sakai and Greiser cases. 
20 Trial of Takashi Sakai, 14 THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS 1-2 (1949).
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based on his hostile activities in China prior to World War II (1931-1939), 
or his activities during the War (1939-1945) itself, or both. Prior to World 
War II, Sakai was a commander of the Japanese 23rd army; during World 
War II he was a Regimental Commander of the 29 Infantry Brigade. Sakai’s 
defense, which was rejected as a matter of law, was that he had acted upon 
the orders of his government.  
The Tribunal found Sakai guilty “of participating in the war of ag-
gression.”21 He also was found guilty of war crimes and crimes against hu-
manity (principally for inciting or permitting his subordinates to commit 
acts of atrocity). He was sentenced to death and was executed in 1946.
The Chinese Tribunal conducted its process under the terms of the 
Chinese Rules Governing the Trial of War Criminals. Article I of these 
Rules identifies the primary source of substantive law for these tribunals to 
be international law, supplemented by the Rules and the Chinese Penal 
Code. The Notes on the Sakai Case state that “[t]he Tribunal’s verdict on 
the count of crimes against peace was made with regard, though without 
express reference, to rules which were explicitly formulated in the latest 
development of international law in this sphere . . . . [T]he Tribunal’s ver-
dict on this count was entirely based upon rules of international law . . . .”22
The Notes make specific mention of the London Charter, the Tokyo Char-
ter, Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (Article II(1)(A)) (which indicated 
that responsibility for crimes against the peace is not confined to high State 
administrators), and Articles I of the Nine Power Treaty and of the Kellogg-
Briand Pact. The Notes also indicate that the Tribunal also relied upon non-
aggression treaties that Japan had signed. 
Sakai was found guilty of aggression because “he had taken part in 
the war of aggression against China.”23 According to the Notes: “No further 
qualifications can be found in the Judgment beyond this point, so that it 
would seem that, according to the Chinese Tribunal, the accused’s liability 
lay in no other circumstances than in the fact that he had conducted military 
operations which formed part of a war of aggression.”24 Although the Tri-
bunal found, as a matter of fact, that Sakai “participated in the war on the 
orders of his Government,”25 it rejected the defense of following orders as a 
matter of international as well as Chinese law. According to the Notes, the 
Tribunal was influenced by the fact that there was a “firmly established rule 
that to commit crimes upon superior orders, including those of a Govern-
ment, does not relieve the perpetrator from penal responsibility, but may be 
21 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
22 Id. at 3, 7. 
23 Id. at 4. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 5. 
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taken in mitigation of punishment.”26 Although Sakai was ordered to partic-
ipate in the aggressive war effort, perhaps somewhat paradoxically the Tri-
bunal also noted that he was “one of the leaders who were instrumental in 
Japan’s aggression in China.”27 That said, his leadership role was not evi-
dent in the Tribunal’s legal finding that it was Sakai’s participation, upon 
orders, in the war effort that served as the basis for his culpability.   
B.  Artur Greiser 
The Supreme National Tribunal of Poland (sitting in Poznan) con-
victed Artur Greiser (1897-1946) of a series of extraordinary international 
crimes, including crimes against the peace, in July 1946.28 First a member 
of the Nazi Party, then a Deputy, Greiser became President of the Danzig 
Senate in the mid 1930’s and, ultimately, the Gauleiter (Governor) of the 
Warthegau, a Polish region attached to the Third Reich following the 1939 
invasion of Poland. Greiser served as “one of the leaders of” the Nazi Party 
in Danzig.29 Together with other Danzig leaders, and in conspiracy with 
central Reich authorities, Greiser was alleged to have prepared, directed, 
and put into effect aggressive measures against Poland. His conduct was 
alleged to span from 1930 to 1945.  While Gauleiter, Greiser “wanted to rid 
his region of Poles and replace them with Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans). 
He took away Polish property, placed Polish orphans with ‘Aryan’ families, 
terrorized the clergy, and limited cultural and educational programs. From 
1939-1945 he kicked out 630,000 Jews and Poles and replaced them with 
537,000 ethnic Germans.”30 The notorious Chelmno death camp was under 
the direct command of SS and Police leadership in the Warthegau which, in 
turn, acted in cooperation with Greiser.31
In terms of the substantive law regarding aggression, the Polish Tri-
bunal relied upon international treaties, the Covenant of the League of Na-
tions, the London Charter, and in particular a non-aggression pact signed 
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1. 
28 Trial of Gauleiter Artur Greiser, 13 THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 70 (1949).
29 Id. at 70 (discussing the indictment). 
30 SHOAH Resource Center, The International School for Holocaust Studies, Yad Va-
shem, Greiser, Arthur (document on file with the author). 
31 Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team, Chelmno Death Camp (2007), 
http://www.holocaustresearchproject.org/othercamps/chelmno.html. “Greiser visited Chelm-
no death camp personally to thank the Commando on their work . . . .” Id. The monument at 
the site of the camp today states that 180,000 Jews were murdered there, along with 4,300 
Gypsies. Id. The charges against Greiser alleged that “[i]t must be taken that more than 
300,000 persons perished in Chelmno.” Trial of Gauleiter Artur Greiser, 13 LAW REPORTS OF 
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS at 95. 
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between Germany and Poland in 1934. It primarily based itself in municipal 
Polish law, however, including Polish decrees passed in the wake of the 
Second World War. In terms of the facts, the Greiser judgment offers an 
exceptionally detailed account of Nazi aggression against Poland (as well as 
of Nazi atrocity in Poland). 
Greiser raised in his defense that: (1) he opposed the war as an in-
strument to attain the goals of the Nazi party; (2) he submitted resignations, 
which were never accepted, on four occasions; (3) he acted upon the express 
orders of Hitler or Himmler and under the strict supervision of central Ger-
man authorities; and (4) that he had only a restricted responsibility for gen-
eral matters of policy.32 He also sought to advance a claim that neither the 
ordinary police, nor the Gestapo, nor the S.S. were “ever subordinated to 
him in any way or measure [but] always took their orders and instructions 
directly from Berlin, and particularly from Himmler.”33
The Tribunal found him guilty of nearly all charges, including 
crimes against the peace. It found him to be “one of the chief instruments” 
in “the gradually unfolding plan for aggressive war on a world scale . . . and 
especially in Danzig . . . .”34 It found Greiser “fanatically given over to the 
idea of a Greater Germany.” 35 Although the Tribunal linked Greiser to Hit-
ler in a “conspiratory” sense, it also held that Greiser “successfully carried 
out the criminal order of his leader.”36 In coming to this latter conclusion, 
the Tribunal seems to implicitly accept that Greiser was not a policy-maker 
or high-level leader, but still convicted him for crimes against the peace. 
Moreover, the Tribunal was minded that superior orders did not serve as a 
matter of penal theory as a defense to the charges against Greiser, including 
charges of crimes against the peace. In this regard, the Tribunal adhered to 
applicable municipal Polish law, where superior orders can only be consi-
dered as a mitigating factor in sentencing.37
32 Trial of Gauleiter Artur Greiser, 13 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS at 
102–103. Specifically, Greiser claimed “for all matters of policy and measures applied and 
carried out in this territory the responsibility rested entirely and exclusively with Hitler and 
Himmler . . . in his actions [Greiser] was always strictly supervised by the central German 
authorities.” Id. at 102. 
33 Id. at 102.  This latter argument flirts with questions regarding command responsibility.  
The Special Working Group has not yet considered whether Article 28 of the Rome Statute 
(responsibility of commanders and other superiors) “should be explicitly excluded with re-
spect to of the crime of aggression.” Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at explanatory note 9. 
34 Trial of Gauleiter Artur Greiser, 13 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS at 104. 
35 Id. at 104. 
36 Id. at 105 (describing Tribunal judgment). The Polish approach in Greiser differs from 
the Nuremberg IMT approach, in that when convicting Hess the Nuremberg IMT empha-
sized he was in such close relationship with Hitler. 
37 Trial of Gauleiter Artur Greiser, 13 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS at 117.  
In commentary on the Milch trial, the LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS observe 
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Greiser was executed by hanging on July 21, 1946 in public in front 
of the Warthegau Governor’s mansion. In addition, the Tribunal pronounced 
the loss of public and civic rights, and the forfeiture of all his property. 
C.  Implications for the Leadership Requirement 
The Nuremberg IMT and military tribunals in subsequent proceed-
ings in both the American and French military zones acquitted suspects 
based on rigorous understandings of the policy-making/leadership require-
ment to the crime of aggression. However, the Greiser and Sakai cases sug-
gest that not all tribunals were so inclined. It is doubtful whether both de-
fendants (in particular Sakai) would meet the policy-maker requirement 
subsequently elucidated in the American Military Tribunal’s High Com-
mand judgment. Consequently, the Special Working Group, insofar as it 
believes the leadership requirement to be of great qualificatory relevance, 
would be well advised explicitly to underscore its importance to the crime 
of aggression. It looks like the Special Working Group will pursue a diffe-
rentiated approach to the crime of aggression. This means that the crime of 
aggression is treated in the same way as the other crimes over which the 
ICC has jurisdiction.38 If this path is pursued, it should follow that the defi-
nition of the crime, the elements of the crime, and/or general principles of 
law in the Rome Statute (e.g. Article 25) contain a clear leadership require-
ment, else a broader array of perpetrators may become implicated. The 2008 
Discussion paper adheres to this advice in terms of its proposed new Ar-
ticles 8 bis(1) and Article 25(3bis).39 In the absence of such a clearly stipu-
that this judgment is an instance of how “the illegal nature of aggressive war has been related 
to the principle that the plea of superior orders can only be effective if the orders were legal 
or if the accused was not aware, and could not reasonably be expected to be aware, of their 
illegality.” 15 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 149 (1949). 
38 The differentiated approach contrasts with monistic approaches, where the crime of 
aggression is treated separately from the general principles of individual criminal responsi-
bility within the Rome Statute. The differentiated approach is ascendant. That said, the lea-
dership requirement, conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, and the interface with admis-
sibility render the crime of aggression, even if the differentiated approach were pursued, 
somewhat anomalous in terms of the operation of the Rome Statute.   
39 Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at explanatory note 3. The leadership requirement at the 
IMT largely was jurisprudential, in that “[i]n the Nuremberg Charter the range of persons 
liable to prosecution and punishment for crimes against peace is defined in the first and last 
paragraph of Article 6. It includes any person implicated in its commission whether as an 
individual or a member of organizations, or as a leader, organizer, instigator or accomplice.” 
Trial of Takashi Sakai, 14 THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, at 4.  Kevin Jon Heller, in an insightful article, remarks that the Special Working 
Group discussions thus far actually represent a “retreat from Nuremberg” in terms of the 
leadership requirement. Kevin Jon Heller, Retreat from Nuremberg: The Leadership Re-
quirement in the Crime of Aggression, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 487–480 (2007).  Heller argues 
that the Special Working Group’s attribution of the leadership requirement to individuals 
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lated requirement, co-perpetration or aiding and abetting could result in a 
situation where someone like Sakai is found individually criminally respon-
sible for what de facto is simple participation in an aggressive war.  
All that said, in Part IV of this Article I revisit the wisdom of an ab-
solute leadership requirement. Although the approach of the Special Work-
ing Group has achieved consensus by guarding against the possibility of 
convictions such as those entered against Greiser or Sakai, I posit that this 
consensus presents certain drawbacks in terms of the normative value of 
international criminal law as well as the ICC’s effectiveness.   
III. CONCERN FOR THE PRESENT: WHAT IS AN “ACT” OF AGGRESSION?
Although their work clearly was groundbreaking, the IMTs limited 
crimes against the peace prosecutions to Nazi and Japanese wars of aggres-
sion. Since then, the official understanding of what constitutes an act of 
aggression largely has hewed to the traditional paradigm of interstate armed 
conflict.40 Within the Special Working Group, there has been debate about 
whether generic or specific approaches should be pursued,41 but both posi-
who “control or direct” the political or military action of a State is more restrictive than what 
he identifies as the “shape or influence” standard articulated at Nuremberg by both the Nu-
remberg IMT and the subsequent military tribunals. Id. at 478-479. Heller concludes: “[T]he 
relevant jurisprudence of the Nuremberg tribunal establishes three basic principles: (1) non-
governmental actors can commit the crime of aggression; (2) aggression is a policy-level 
crime; and (3) an individual is at the policy level if he is in a position to ‘shape or influence’ 
a state’s political or military action.”  Id. at 488. In particular, Heller expresses concern that 
the Special Working Group’s consensus might omit the responsibility of industrialists as well 
as political or military officials in a state who are complicit in another state’s acts of aggres-
sion. Id. at 479-480.  In the report of its final session (February 9-13, 2009), the Special 
Working Group noted that “[t]he view was also expressed that the language of [article 
25(3bis)] was sufficiently broad to include persons with effective control over the political or 
military action of a State but who are not normally part of the relevant government, such as 
industrialists.” Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, supra note
3, ¶ 25. It is unclear how broadly shared this view actually is within the Special Working 
Group; also unclear is whether any legal interpretation of article 25(3bis) that would even-
tually be made by judges would accord with “the view” in light of Heller’s examination of 
the proscriptive language in comparative historical context.  
40 The Chairman of the Working Group on Aggression stated in a press conference on 
January 31, 2007, that “aggression was defined as an act committed by a State against a 
State, but since the Rome Statute was a criminal one, it related to individual criminal respon-
sibility.”  Press Conference, Chairman of Working Group on Crime of Aggression (Jan. 31, 
2007) (document in the Conference Materials and on file with the author). 
41 “It was recalled that a generic definition was one which does not include a list of acts of 
aggression, while a specific definition was accompanied by such a list, for example the one 
contained in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 
1974.” Assembly of States Parties, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression, Doc. ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF.1, ¶ 7 (Sept. 5, 2006). 
Expanding the range of acts of aggression might be compatible with both approaches: for the 
generic approach by interpretation, for the specific approach by adding explicit references.  
2009] THE PUSH TO CRIMINALIZE AGGRESSION 305
tions share in common the assumption that an act of aggression anchors 
within the classic paradigm of the illegal interstate use of armed force. Pro-
posed Article 8 bis(2), potentially a compromise between these positions, 
continues to reflect this assumption by clearly and narrowly presenting ag-
gression as involving an international war that violates the jus ad bellum.
Article 8 bis(2) is deeply state-centric and, in practical terms, covers bomb-
ings, invasions, and soldiers and munitions crossing international borders. 
The Special Working Group’s proposed definition of the crime of aggres-
sion is a throwback to Nuremberg and Tokyo and a return to the 1974 Gen-
eral Assembly Declaration which, in fact, is posited by the Special Working 
Group as constituting “the basis for” the contemporary definition.42
The current conversation at the Special Working Group thereby 
continues to frame an act of aggression quite conservatively. There are im-
portant instrumental reasons for proceeding in this manner. One reason is 
that, simply put, proceeding conservatively offers an easier path to consen-
sus. The ground is settled at the core; it is considerably more controversial 
on the perimeter. The ICC’s work already may be plagued by enough con-
troversy.43 Why add more, especially when the Special Working Group has 
effected concrete progress in the direction of defining the crime of aggres-
sion?44 Theodor Meron, in the United States’ statement regarding the crime 
of aggression, underscores how the “prudence displayed in Rome has prov-
In order to respect important principles of legality, however, any expansion of the acts con-
stitutive of aggression should proceed through the specific and explicit inclusion of offenses 
in the Rome Statute language, in particular for non-customary offenses.  Proceeding along 
these lines would minimize the potential for judicial activism and overreach, while also 
discouraging vagueness challenges by potential defendants. See generally Kenneth S. Gal-
lant, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 407 
(2009) (“[I]t is extremely difficult to see how a definition of aggression that included acts 
other than the planning, ordering, or leading of attacks by one sovereign state on territory 
within the jurisdiction of another sovereign state for the purpose of conquest – essentially the 
World War II-type of situation – could be considered a current customary international crim-
inal law definition of aggression as an individual crime.”)  
42 Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at explanatory note 4. 
43 For example, the Prosecutor’s application for an arrest warrant for Sudanese President 
al-Bashir has prompted new conversations among several permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council about the possibility of a deferral under article 16 of the Rome 
Statute.
44 Assuredly, to varying degrees consensus has eluded the Special Working Group among 
a number of other important areas, such as: the amendment process, trigger mechanism, 
conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, whether a determination by the Security Council 
that an act of aggression has occurred is a threshold determination or necessarily binds the 
ICC Prosecutor or the judges, and the delimitation of what, exactly, constitute exceptions to 
aggression (i.e. humanitarian armed intervention). This Article does not consider these is-
sues. It is possible that controversy regarding these issues would be exacerbated were the 
Special Working Group, or Review Conference, to revisit what otherwise appears to have 
been settled.   
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en wise . . . . [O]ne of the reasons why the list of crimes in the Statute of the 
ICC has attained such a credibility and why that list has had such a signifi-
cant impact on national legislations is exactly because of the high level of 
comfort that the general conformity of Articles 7-8 [n.b. has] with customa-
ry law . . . ”45 And “[u]nder customary law is it only aggressive war that 
founds individual criminal responsibility.”46 Moreover, simply defining a 
crime of aggression—however narrow—for the purpose of the ICC would 
represent a major step forward in establishing aggression as part of interna-
tional legal practice and in taking a spirited stand against the horrors of “un-
authorized war-making.”47 Discussing and codifying law beyond the para-
meters of custom may be controversial and may chip away at the ICC’s 
legitimacy, at least in the short term.
That said, I wonder if international criminal lawyers should think 
twice about limiting the act to this narrow, conventional proscription. I 
would like to gently challenge this conventional wisdom by pointing to the 
dialogic, expressive, and discursive value of a broader conversation regard-
ing acts of aggression. That conversation might begin with the following 
question: What are the international interests we hope to protect by crimina-
lizing aggression? I posit that there are four such interests: (1) stability, (2) 
security, (3) human rights, and (4) sovereignty.48 If we are agreed as to the 
interests at play, then the question follows whether criminalizing only inter-
state armed attacks that flagrantly violate the jus ad bellum captures the key 
stability, security, human rights, and sovereignty challenges that the interna-
tional community currently faces. I think that the answer to this question is 
‘no.’ Consider the following:  
internal armed conflict;  
attacks by states against their own populations/civilians;  
non-state actor violence, for example systemic attacks by terrorist 
groups—such as Al-Qaeda—or by narco-terrorist syndicates;49
45 Crime of Aggression: Statement by the United States (Theodor Meron) (Dec. 6, 2000).  
46 CRYER ET AL., supra note 1, at 273. 
47 Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression
6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 551,  566 (2007). 
48 Assuredly, these various interests may overlap with each other, may reinforce each 
other, or may even stand in tension with each other in a given case. See LARRY MAY,
AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE (2008) (positing that aggression should be defined 
as a first wrong that violates human rights). May writes largely within a state-centric frame-
work to cast aggression as prosecutable “when one State undermines the ability of another 
State to protect human rights.” Id. at 3. 
49 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Professor, DePaul University College of Law, Keynote Address at 
the Case Western Reserve University Frederick K. Cox International Law Center: The Inter-
national Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression (Sept. 26, 2008) (exploring how the 
internal command and control structures of terrorist organizations are quite different than 
those of a classic army). According to Professor Bassiouni, terrorist organizations have no 
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massive cyber-attacks; and widespread, long-term, severe, and de-
liberately inflicted environmental harms.  
Each of these phenomena—to varying degrees—presents major 
threats to all four protected interests. These threats rival those posed by in-
terstate armed conflict. They are occasioned intentionally by leaders of 
states or non-state actors. Hence, this category of threats—which I identify 
as the first category—is readily capable of analogy to the threats proscribed 
by the Special Working Group’s current understanding of the acts constitu-
tive of the crime of aggression. However, the narrow framing of the crime 
of aggression keeps all of these first-category threats off the discussion table 
despite the fact that each of them could well cause the kinds of effects nor-
mally associated with war among states.50
I also posit a second category of threats that includes phenomena 
that are significantly less capable of analogy to either inter-state armed con-
flict or the first-category threats I list above.  I include climate change and 
public health pandemics among these threats.  In the case of climate change, 
which arises from ordinary human activity, reputable scientists posit that, if 
left unchecked, its effects might include the submerging of territory under-
water (even of entire small island states), the triggering of massive refugee 
movements, and the exacerbation of desertification. If we assume the accu-
racy of these scientific predictions, these effects if left unchecked would 
thereby arise not intentionally but, rather, from willfully blind, negligent, or 
innocent failure to act by a number of actors, including states (for example, 
in terms of curbing greenhouse gas emissions).  I flag these second-category 
threats en passant insofar as in certain regions of the world the sovereignty, 
security, human rights, and stability effects of unchecked climate change 
upon affected populations are significant in light of the great difficulty 
among populations to adapt thereto.51 In the end, however, it seems most 
(or limited) centralized command and control structure, deploy power in a deeply asymme-
trical context, and are composed of subordinate members who operate with considerable 
independence.  For a discussion of the security threats posed by non-state actors and envi-
ronmental threats, see U.S. National Defense Strategy (June 2008), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.pdf.  
50 Although discussions regarding the scope of an act of aggression are longstanding, 
many of the threats discussed in the Part are newer entrants to formal international law-
making discourse.  Accordingly, many have not yet been comprehensively contemplated 
within the framework of aggression and thereby represent some discontinuity with prior 
discussions.  Assuredly, individual participation in some of the enumerated first-category 
threats may be captured by other crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction or by transnational 
criminal law.  This overlap also arises in the case of criminalizing interstate armed attacks, 
insofar as it is highly probable that such conduct would also involve the commission of 
atrocity crimes as proscribed by the ICC. 
51 Are these second-category threats the kinds of phenomena that ought to fall within the 
definition of “acts” of aggression and, hence, for which penal or civil responsibility ought to 
flow? There are self-evident reasons not to extend responsibility in this direction. First, the 
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sensible to begin the conversation about revisiting the parameters of acts of 
aggression with first-category threats alone. The remainder of this article 
focuses only on these first-category threats.  
In the case of these first-category threats, although the Special 
Working Group’s conservative framing may facilitate consensus, it may 
simultaneously sacrifice a forthright dialogue about the major peace and 
order challenges faced by the global community, in particular by developing 
nations. Many of these challenges do not flow from international armed 
conflict (though they may in turn create conditions that encourage interna-
tional armed conflict).  It remains unclear whether, as a matter of practice, 
interstate armed attacks today singularly constitute the gravest and most 
widespread violations of collective security interests. As the nature of the 
threats to collective interests shifts, might the law shift as well? If so, might 
the direction of the change be one that expands, instead of contracts, what, 
exactly, constitutes an act of aggression?     
Alternately, if such a dialogic enlargement simply were unworka-
ble, one response might be for the Special Working Group to contemplate 
expanding the concept of the unlawful use of force to cover these sorts of 
threats, with consequent state, organizational, or tortious civil responsibility 
drafters of the Rome Statute avoided criminalizing negligent behavior and also opposed strict 
liability. Any expansion of a crime to cover situations that may include recklessness or will-
ful disregard intersects brusquely with the nature of the other crimes within the ICC’s juris-
diction, as well as the assumption of gravity that underpins the institution’s operational legi-
timacy. See, e.g. Margaret M. DeGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International 
Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 2009), draft paper available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1257612 (“The gravity of the crimes it adjudicates represents the 
principal normative justification for the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.”). 
That said, taking responsibility need not presuppose being blameworthy.  Jeffrey Blustein, 
THE MORAL DEMANDS OF MEMORY (2008). Second, extending the scope of international 
criminal law to these threats might promote excessive alarmism and securitization that, in 
turn, may induce states to respond to such threats through the use of force or humanitarian 
military intervention, thereby liberalizing the recourse to violence in international relations. 
On the other hand, normatively couching these threats in the language of international crimi-
nal law might inject some urgency to regulatory enforcement and treaty negotiations, while 
also enhancing administrative supervision in these areas more generally. If the Security 
Council is determined to be a trigger mechanism for the ICC’s exercise of jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression, the existence of a broader definition of potential acts of aggression 
also could enrich the kinds of conversations within the Security Council regarding what, 
exactly, constitutes aggression, threats to, or breaches of the peace.  That said, it remains 
contested and unclear whether climate change and other collective action problems are well-
served by being framed as breaches of the global trust instead of as regulatory concerns. 
Perhaps the security implications of inaction on climate change and public health are better 
left to issue-specific regulatory frameworks that mix sticks and carrots or to aspirational 
human rights frameworks. But it would seem more convincing to arrive at such a conclusion 
after having carefully considered other ways to frame state decisions not to act in regard to 
these phenomena, including proscription by international criminal law, and having discarded 
these other frames.    
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or liability outside of the ICC jurisdictional regime as currently structured. 
Certainly, as the ICJ intoned in the Bosnia v. Serbia Genocide Convention 
litigation, individual penal responsibility does not extinguish broader no-
tions of state civil or declaratory responsibility.52 Might the Special Work-
ing Group consider the interface of criminalizing such threats with the pro-
hibition of the unlawful use of force generally?  One initiative in this regard 
would be to explore how the ICC might co-ordinate with the work of the 
ICJ. At this juncture, it is valuable to recall that, in 2005, the ICJ attributed 
state responsibility to Uganda for its unlawful use of force against the DRC 
(although it resisted ruling on the DRC’s aggression claim). Another initia-
tive would connect the discussion with economic sanctions or punitive 
measures for which, perhaps, institutions such as the World Trade Organi-
zation could be deployed. In making such connections, scholars and jurists 
would need to revisit the interface between international economic law and 
international criminal law. Economic sanctions present a tricky situation.  
On the one hand, economic sanctions can impose great hardship on ordinary 
citizens of targeted states, who may have no ability to influence their of-
fending governments.  On the other hand, economic sanctions constitute a 
useful tool to bring states into compliance with international obligations.53
Since one of the Rome Statute’s major legacies is its spill-over ef-
fect in terms of domestic incorporation of international crimes, an expanded 
conversation at the level of the Special Working Group could spark greater 
interchange at national levels. Insofar as most states have not yet crimina-
lized aggression in their domestic laws (only 27 states have proscribed the 
crime of aggression in national jurisdictions and, other than cases of new 
states, all of these precede the adoption of the Rome Statute),54 states will 
52 See generally Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia), 2007 I.C.J. General List No. 91 (Feb. 
26), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf.   
53 Cuba had raised the prospect that economic sanctions could constitute an act of aggres-
sion.  In response, criminalizing the use of economic sanctions might inhibit certain kinds of 
civil and state responsibility mechanisms that could be useful in sanctioning (or even pre-
venting) aggression. If the definition of aggression were expanded to include economic sanc-
tions, how would sanctions geared to the common good (i.e. stigmatizing abusive regimes) 
be distinguished from purely punitive sanctions that have a harmful effect on populations? 
54 Conversation with Conference Participant Astrid Reisinger-Coracini Regarding her 
Research, Sept. 26, 2008. Interestingly, Reisinger-Coracini notes that some of these states 
adopted domestic proscriptions on the crime of aggression in order to protect themselves 
from potential leadership decisions that would entangle them as aggressors in wars that they 
might either lose or that would inflict great suffering on their populations. To this end, the 
assumption that states are hostile to an expanded crime of aggression does not fully square 
with the rationale why states in some cases have included the crime of aggression in domes-
tic jurisdictions. Just as states may fear that codification of the crime of aggression may 
inhibit their ability to use force in the national interest, so too may states fear that a failure to 
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look to the Rome Statute definition for guidance—meaning that now might 
be an opportune time for progressive development of the law regarding ag-
gression and unlawful use of force.  Although the principal purpose of the 
Rome Statute is to delimit the jurisdiction of the ICC, it also plays a much 
larger law reform, discursive, and codification function, the potential of 
which the Special Working Group certainly recognizes.  
Assuredly, there is another side to this debate. For one, this entire 
conversation may be practically futile insofar as there is no indication of 
any will in the Special Working Group negotiations to transcend interstate 
armed acts as the singular kinds of acts of aggression.55 Furthermore, even 
in cases of first-category threats, what I propose would likely expand the 
Rome Statute’s definition of aggression beyond that found in customary 
international law, thereby running afoul of Meron’s sage advice (and also 
diminishing the likelihood that the United States ever joins the ICC). If the 
Special Working Group casts the first-category threats I have identified as 
aggression, perhaps states would respond through backlash and fears of 
overlegalization, thereby occasioning withdrawal from a variety of interna-
tional regimes (e.g. those proscribing terrorism or addressing jus in bello in 
non-international armed conflict) instead of incentivizing state adhesion to 
these regimes.  Too broadly expanding the category of aggression might 
place the crime at odds with the depraved moral gravity of the other crimes 
within the ICC’s jurisdiction, such as genocide and crimes against humani-
ty. In response, the first-category threats do seem to share similar moral 
gravity and, certainly, similar intentionality of conduct.  When it comes to 
questions whether a state can commit aggression against its own people, or 
whether non-state actors can commit aggression, or whether military dep-
loyments other than classic use of force (i.e. cyber attacks) could constitute 
aggression, issues of causation, attribution, and moral responsibility are 
analogous to those implicated by the illegal interstate use of force.
If the purpose of the criminalization of aggression is to protect secu-
rity, stability, sovereignty, and human rights interests, crimping the conver-
sation by focusing only on the core prohibitions that emerged six decades 
ago leaves a significant array of serious threats outside the framework of 
international criminal law or the law of state responsibility for serious 
breaches of erga omnes obligations.  As such, amid its instrumental bene-
fits, the path chosen by the Special Working Group also triggers opportunity 
costs. This path effectively pursues a least common denominator approach 
codify this crime may leave unchecked the ability of their governments to launch them into 
aggressive wars. 
55 E-mail from Roger Clark, Board of Governors Professor of Law, Rutgers School of 
Law, to Mark A. Drumbl, Class of 1975 Alumni Chair of Law and Director, Transnational 
Law Institute, Washington and Lee University, School of Law (Oct. 25, 2007) (on file with 
the author) (“I’m sure that it has never been discussed in the ICC aggression context.”).  
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that represents only the base-line that all state-parties accept.  Although 
there is considerable value in getting a core definition in place, there also 
are plentiful reasons for looking beyond. Incidentally, these two goals are 
not mutually exclusive.  There can be more than one lane ahead.  
IV. QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE: PUNISHING THE AGGRESSOR
International criminal tribunals, along with their constitutive in-
struments, evoke a number of justifications for why they punish perpetrators 
of extraordinary international crimes. These justifications include retribu-
tion, deterrence, and expressivism; and, on a subaltern level, rehabilitation, 
reintegration, reconciliation, and incapacitation. To some degree, these jus-
tifications inform the aggravating and mitigating factors that affect the 
quantum of sentence. I have elsewhere argued that international criminal 
law experiences considerable difficulty in attaining retributive or deterrent 
goals, but that it is somewhat more successful in operationalizing its expres-
sive aspirations.56 I provide the following working definition of expressiv-
ism:   
The expressivist punishes to strengthen faith in rule of law among the gen-
eral public, as opposed to punishing simply because the perpetrator de-
serves it or because potential perpetrators will be deterred by it. Expressiv-
ism also transcends retribution and deterrence in claiming as a central goal 
the crafting of historical narratives, their authentication as truths, and their 
pedagogical dissemination to the public.57
What is more, “[f]rom an expressivist perspective, punishment proactively 
embeds the normative value of law within the community.”58
The purpose of this Part is not to revisit the general debate over the 
role of sentencing and punishment in international criminal law; nor is it to 
unpack whether the sentences actually awarded by international punishing 
institutions attain the avowed aspirations.59 Rather, my purpose is to ask: 
what are the penological objectives of punishing aggression and sentencing 
an aggressor? Resolution 3314, for its part, raises deterrence as a punitive 
rationale.60  Given the difficulty that international punishment for genocide, 
56 See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 173–179
(2007).
57 Id. at 173. 
58 Id. at 61. 
59 See, e.g., id.; see also Jens David Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory of International 
Criminal Sentencing (Sept. 11, 2008) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (arguing 
that international criminal justice is predicated on retributive notions and that its sentencing 
policy must follow suit and heed offense-gravity proportionality). 
60 Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 Annex, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2319th plen. 
mtg. (Dec. 14, 1974), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/ares29.htm (“Con-
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war crimes, and crimes against humanity experiences in generally deterring 
such crimes, it simply may not be realistic to expect that things would be 
different when it comes to aggression. For the sake of argument, however, 
let’s assume that would-be aggressors would in fact be deterred. In that 
case, a new set of concerns arises—namely, whether we are deterring the 
right kind of use of force. In other words, do we necessarily wish to deter 
humanitarian armed intervention or on-the-ground deployments that could 
decelerate (or even prevent) genocide or crimes against humanity? Noah 
Weisbord echoes the warning that criminalizing aggression “may deter the 
wrong sort of violent actions, actions that reduce human suffering such as 
the unauthorized use of force to prevent genocide.”61 In response, the Spe-
cial Working Group may find it prudent to except bona fide humanitarian 
actions from the scope of aggression.  
On a broader note, should the penological rationales for the crime 
of aggression parallel those of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes? Is aggression of a different offense-gravity than these other 
crimes?62 Is aggression still the “supreme international crime”63 (in the 
words of the Nuremberg IMT) and, if so, should it be punished more 
harshly than the other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute? 
That said, even the Nuremberg sentences do not support this line of deduc-
tion. At Nuremberg, one defendant was convicted only of aggression 
charges (counts I and II) and several were convicted only of war crimes or 
crimes against humanity (counts III and IV). Hess, convicted only on counts 
I and II, was given a life sentence; the six defendants convicted only on 
counts III and/or IV were given four death sentences (Bormann [in absen-
tia], Frank, Kaltenbrunner, and Streicher) and two sentences of 20 years’ 
imprisonment (Speer and von Schirach). Moreover, insofar as genocide has 
vinced that the adoption of a definition of aggression ought to have the effect of deterring a 
potential aggressor . . . .”). Although not explicitly stated as such, the kind of deterrence 
contemplated by Resolution 3314 appears to be general deterrence.  See also Kevin Jon 
Heller, Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute 18 (unpublished manuscript on file with 
the author) (noting that the ICC Office of the Prosecutor “has recognized the importance of 
deterrence, adopting it as the ‘third principle’ guiding its prosecutorial strategy”). 
61 Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L. J. 161, 220 (2008). 
62 International criminal law has distinguished genocide and crimes against humanity from 
armed conflict (even though generally these atrocity crimes arise during times of armed 
conflict) and has constructed them as something that can transcend or run independently 
from a war effort. Aggression, on the other hand, is the criminalization of the war effort 
itself.  Accordingly, it is a deeply collective crime (so, too, is genocide and crimes against 
humanity, although there may be some important differences among these crimes as to their 
collective nature).   
63 Nuremberg IMT Judgment, supra note 6, at 186 (“To initiate a war of aggression . . . is 
not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from 
other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole”).   
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since become the “crime of crimes” (in the words of the ICTR), it may no 
longer be accurate to describe aggression as the “supreme international 
crime” unless superlative status somehow can be shared.   
Another complicating factor arises: it is unclear whether the ICC 
would prosecute the crime of aggression in the absence of evidence that 
atrocity crimes—namely genocide, crimes against humanity, or widespread 
war crimes—also had been committed in the situation in question or, even, 
in the case of an individual accused.64 Sakai and Greiser both involved 
grievous atrocity crimes in addition to aggressive war. Expressive goals still 
could be attained in multiple prosecutions, so long as the charges were set 
out separately and signaled out for independent denunciation. However, it 
seems doubtful that an additional layer of prosecution for aggression could 
deter or serve retributive purposes, particularly in cases where a defendant 
already, by dint of convictions on atrocity charges, would approach or reach 
the maximum available sentence. Regarding the expressive value, the Sakai 
and Greiser cases relate a broader account of the structure and implementa-
tion of aggressive war and its effects on civilians. These cases thereby 
weave a broader narrative tapestry that adds considerable value.   
As the Special Working Group advances in its project of criminaliz-
ing aggression, it might consider some of the questions this Part raises and 
discuss guidelines for sentencing, mitigating and aggravating factors, and a 
heuristic in which to assess why, exactly, one aggressor should receive a 
longer term of imprisonment than another. 
I believe the expressive value of criminalizing aggression justifies 
moving ahead with defining the crime so as to include it within the ICC’s 
operations. Moreover, expressive justifications, as well as the reality of con-
temporary security threats, ought to push us toward defining the crime 
beyond the inter-state aggressive war paradigm. If part of the purpose of 
international criminal law is to stigmatize and denounce conduct that threat-
ens core stability, security, human rights, and sovereignty interests, then it 
would seem valuable to frame the discourse of aggression in a wider fa-
shion.  
I also wonder, if the expressive goal is pursued, whether one option 
might be—notwithstanding the consensus within the Special Working 
Group in its favor—to thaw the leadership requirement so that more indi-
viduals could be prosecuted.65 Implicating defendants other than those who 
effectively exercise control over the political or military action of a state 
would create a broader narrative with heightened didactic potential. After 
64 MAY, supra note 48, at 3–4 (arguing that aggression charges should be pursued only if 
the defendant’s acts involved serious human rights violations). 
65 For the argument that the Special Working Group’s leadership requirement is more 
onerous than that developed jurisprudentially at Nuremberg, see Heller, supra note 39.
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all, the Greiser and Sakai cases relate important stories. Lowering the lea-
dership requirement might permit more of these kinds of stories to be told. 
One thing is clear: without the committed support of the mid to upper-level 
ranks, there would be no war effort at all. To be sure, as the I.G. Farben and
Krupp judgments noted, reaching down and criminally implicating every-
one, including the foot soldier, who somehow assists in the war effort would 
be tantamount to mass punishment.66  However, there is room for including 
upper and senior ranks in a way that falls outside of the absolutely high lea-
dership requirement but does not begin to approach mass punishment. 
Furthermore, insofar as one of the main legacies of the Rome Sta-
tute is its catalyzing effect on substantive criminal law in national jurisdic-
tions, the crimes as defined in the Rome Statute will likely become trans-
planted into domestic judicial structures, where they would be applied to a 
broader array of suspects. Too onerous a leadership requirement might inhi-
bit the ability of national courts (or other accountability mechanisms) to root 
out the deeper, systemic causes of aggression. One concern with the com-
bined effect of proposed Article 8bis(1) and proposed Article 25(3bis) lies 
in its anchoring of an absolute leadership requirement, which effectively 
bestows collective innocence on all involved in aggressive war below the 
levels of the state political and military elite. Were this definition incorpo-
rated into domestic law, it would immunize all the smaller fish from crimi-
nal responsibility. Is this inoculation necessarily desirable? The requirement 
that only top leaders can commit the crime of aggressive war67 distinguishes 
66 The I.G. Farben Trial, 10 THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS 37–38 (1949) (“To depart from the concept that only major war criminals—
that is, those persons in the political, military, and industrial fields, for example, who were 
responsible for the formulation and execution of policies—may be held liable for waging 
wars of aggression would lead far afield. Under such circumstances there could be no prac-
tical limitation on criminal responsibility that would not include, on principle, the private 
soldier on the battlefield, the farmer who increased his production of foodstuffs to sustain the 
armed forces, or the housewife who conserved fats for the making of munitions.”); The 
Krupp Trial, 10 THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS, at 127–128 (Judge Anderson’s concurring opinion) (also underscoring deterrence 
as a penological goal of proscribing aggressive war).    
67 Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at explanatory note 3. Although the law-in-practice is 
still nascent, leadership requirements de facto animate the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s 
work in prosecuting other crimes. However, in cases of other crimes these requirements do 
not go to the theoretical question whether the defendant can commit the crime but, rather, go 
to questions of admissibility. Even if in his practice the ICC Prosecutor only were to prose-
cute genocidal leaders, there is no substantive leadership requirement to the crime of geno-
cide, meaning that underlings actually can commit the crime—unlike underlings in the ser-
vice of an aggressive war. Similarly, even if a position of leadership might serve as a factor 
for the ICC to consider in issuing an arrest warrant for crimes against humanity, this position 
is not a condition precedent for an individual to have committed the crime. See generally 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application 
for an Arrest Warrant (Feb. 10, 2006). 
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the crime from others in the Rome Statute. This requirement portends an 
absence of prosecutions, or other forms of accountability at the national 
level, insofar as national courts would have to amend the Rome Statute lan-
guage if they wished to prosecute a broader array of defendants. Another 
disjuncture that arises is that, whereas under the Rome Statute superior or-
ders can not serve as a defense to genocide or crimes against humanity,68
most anyone who receives an order can not be prosecuted for aggression 
under the current Special Working Group’s framework.69
To this point, my concerns with the leadership requirement have 
been conceptual. But a top leadership requirement also presents operational 
concerns for the ICC Prosecutor. At the ad hoc and internationalized tribun-
als, prosecutors have availed themselves of a number of strategies, includ-
ing to convict lower- to mid-level operatives for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes. These convictions help authenticate an eviden-
tiary record that, in turn, can assist in cases made against senior officials 
whose convictions, in turn, can help implicate top leadership. These convic-
tions may secure testimony against higher-ups through plea bargains or 
hopes for clemency in sentencing. If only the very top leadership can be 
prosecuted for aggression, then the Prosecutor will be unable to rely on the 
trials and convictions of senior officers as part of the process of making a 
case against a top leader.  If individuals outside of top leadership never can 
commit aggression, a prosecutor cannot threaten to indict them and, thereby, 
loses a bargaining chip in the process of obtaining their testimony.  The 
leadership requirement also clashes with a 2003 policy paper in which the 
ICC Prosecutor recognized that “[i]n some cases the focus of an investiga-
tion . . . may go wider than high-ranking officers . . . [to] . . . certain types of 
crimes of those officers lower down the chain of command [which may be] 
necessary for the whole case.”70  Trials against heads-of-states, or top gen-
erals, are among the most complex and delicate that an international crimi-
nal tribunal can conduct. It is much easier for such a trial to proceed within 
a context of established facts, the legitimacy of lower-level convictions, and 
pre-existing inculpatory testimony, instead of proceeding in a vacuum.71
68 Under certain circumstances, the Rome Statute permits superior orders to serve as a 
defense to charges of war crimes. 
69 See Int’l Crim. Ct., Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Report of the 
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ¶¶ 17–21, ICC-ASP/6/20/Add.1 (June 
6, 2008). This result is contrary to findings of law in both the Sakai and Greiser cases.    
70 Int’l Crim. Ct., Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues, at 3 (Sept. 2003),  
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-60AA962E 
D8B6/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf.  
71 Assuredly, it may be that aggression only becomes prosecuted in contexts where atroci-
ty crimes also are prosecuted. It would be somewhat awkward, however, to bargain away 
atrocity charges against a perpetrator in exchange for his tendering inculpatory evidence 
against a leader accused of aggression. 
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To this end, expanding the conversation about the kinds of activities
that constitute aggression energizes a conversation about who can commit 
aggression. In this latter conversation, regard could be had for the catalytic 
participation not only of military and political leaders, but also economic, 
business, organizational, and industrial leaders/profiteers. Aggression is a 
deeply collective crime. It is unclear whether the Special Working Group’s 
focus only on persons who must effectively exercise control over the politi-
cal or military action of a state captures industrialists, arms traders, or arms 
smugglers. To this end, as Heller points out and despite the Special Work-
ing Group’s “view” to the contrary, the Discussion Paper’s language ap-
pears, at first blush, even more restrictive than the jurisprudence emerging 
from Nuremberg.72 Moreover, the decentralized and fragmented groups that 
pose major security threats today do not proceed in the highly organized and 
hierarchical lines of the Wehrmacht or Imperial Army and, accordingly, an 
absolute leadership requirement may not square so cleanly with fighters 
whose call to arms is not animated by a strict sense of national obligation 
but, rather, in some cases by a more independent assertion of agency. 
The German High Command Trial proceeded on the assumption 
that the ordinary officer should be spared individual criminal guilt.  The 
Tribunal noted that: 
We do not hesitate to state that it would have been eminently desirable had 
the Commanders of the German Armed Forces refused to implement the 
policy of the Third Reich by means of aggressive war. It would have been 
creditable to them not to contribute to the cataclysmic catastrophe. This 
would have been the honourable and righteous thing to do; it would have 
been in the interest of their state. Had they done so they would have served 
their fatherland and humanity also. But however much their failure is mo-
rally reprimandable, we are of the opinion and hold that international 
common law, at the time they so acted, had not developed to the point of 
making the participation of military officers below the policy-making or 
policy influencing level into a criminal offense in and of itself.73
There is considerable cause to debate whether it is proper, in con-
text of system criminality such as that of aggression, to absolve such a 
broad swath of officers (whose participation is a condition precedent to the 
massive nature of the crime) of all penal responsibility. Even more ques-
tionable is whether the officers’ “morally reprimandable” failure should be 
spared any consequence at all. The collectivization of innocence on individ-
uals in the aggressive war effort may create an odd set of incentives, insofar 
as there is nothing to be gained for these officers to resist the war effort. In 
72 See supra note 39. 
73 The German High Command Trial, 12 THE U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N LAW REPORTS 
OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, at 69. 
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fact, if we assume (as the Special Working Group does) that law motivates 
behavior, whether directly or by omission, then this vast set of officers 
might effectively be incentivized to partake in the war effort because they 
would never be criminally responsible for their conduct in the event the 
aggressive effort failed or became judicialized. My argument here is not that 
the criminal prosecution of participants in aggressive war necessarily leads 
to justice. I have often underscored the many limits to criminal trials in the 
aftermath of human tragedy. But I am concerned that the inability of anyone 
below the level of the absolute leader to commit the crime of aggression 
might have broader implications for the responsibility of those officials in 
the context of other accountability mechanisms. In other words, bestowing 
collective innocence upon this vast array of individuals might inhibit the 
ability of truth commissions, public inquiries, reparations, restitution, rein-
tegrative processes, and other forms of justice at the national level actually 
to implicate them in an accountability process.   
In this vein, it may be opportune to inquire whether aggression is 
the kind of crime for which collective sanctions might be suitable—for ex-
ample, sanctions on military officers and political appointees. Mark Osiel 
raises this prospect in the context of atrocity law, where he posits that col-
lective monetary sanctions on the officer corps would heighten peer super-
vision.74 Osiel specifically argues that holding all officers of a similar or 
higher rank financially liable when one of their peers commits atrocity 
serves a supervisory function. Looking beyond Osiel’s framework: might 
the prospect of collective monetary sanctions for members of the officer 
corps incentivize them ex ante to resist being used in the service of aggres-
sion? Might this prospect dissuade officers from joining in the embryonic 
stages when conflict entrepreneurs sow the seeds of future aggressive war?  
These are important lines of inquiry, not currently on the table, that could 
help expand the reach of international criminal law and its interface with 
other international regulatory structures in the areas of obligation, tort, and 
civil responsibility. The ascendency of individual culpability in international 
law should not come at the expense of collective responsibility for criminal, 
tortious, or delictual conduct that constitutes a serious breach of the prohibi-
tion of the unlawful use of force.   
In the end, I hope the extant consensus within the Special Working 
Group around an absolute leadership requirement does not foreclose norma-
tive discussion of the impact of such a requirement on protecting the stabili-
ty, security, human rights, and sovereignty interests that should animate the 
proscription of aggression. 
74 Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1761 (2005). 
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V. CONCLUSION
If the goal of criminalizing aggression is to denounce human rights 
abuses, promote stability, protect legitimate assertions of sovereignty, and 
foster security, then the Special Working Group faces a choice. It can pro-
ceed to successfully criminalize a narrow set of conduct—interstate armed 
attacks—that forms only a small part of the threats to these interests. As part 
of this process, the Special Working Group can focus only on the top-level 
leaders of such conduct. It can include these crimes within the Rome Statute 
at a time when the ICC is merely beginning its activities.75 And it can stop 
there.
Alternately, the Special Working Group can uncork a larger conver-
sation that is less focused on criminalizing something narrow but, instead, 
recognizes the breadth of security threats which populations everywhere, 
particularly in the developing world, face. This more robust conversation 
can occur now. Or it can occur later in time. After all, the development of a 
definition of the crime of aggression can proceed iteratively – first with the 
core, and then expand outwards. The Special Working Group could propose 
a core definition of aggression limited to inter-state armed attacks, but then 
continue its work and chart broader parameters. It might be possible to do-
vetail some of this discussion with the collateral process of determining the 
elements of the crime, a process that requires considerably more attention.76
A third possibility is a hybrid approach. Here, the Special Working 
Group would stick to the narrow path in terms of the criminal law, but open 
a debate about broader sanctions and accountability outside the criminal law 
context—for example within the concept of responsibility for the unlawful 
use of force. Opening this debate could germinate a vibrant discourse that 
could be continued at the national level, within the International Law Com-
mission, and within academic circles.  
75 The Review Conference is scheduled for 2010. Int’l Crim. Ct., Coalition for the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, The Rome Statute: Future Perspectives and Challenges, ¶ 18 (July 3, 
2008) (prepared by William R. Pace).   I earlier contended that the present moment is a suit-
able time to progressively revisit the definition of aggression. But let’s play devil’s advocate: 
let’s take a different perspective, and imagine different timing. What if the Special Working 
Group waited several years and proposed including the definition once the ICC has estab-
lished a track-record, greater legitimacy, assuaged fears, and demonstrated its effectiveness 
and competence? Might this be a more propitious moment for the crime of aggression to 
enter the ICC’s operational framework? To be sure, pragmatic pressure may encourage push-
ing through a crime of aggression at this point in the ICC’s development. In the event the 
ICC’s law-in-practice assuages critics and satisfies supporters, however, conditions might 
become more conducive to including a more comprehensive and wide-ranging crime of 
aggression in the Rome Statute. 
76 Discussion Paper, supra note 3, at explanatory note 9 (warning that “[t]hese elements 
have not been thoroughly discussed in the past. Given the progress in other parts of the dis-
cussion, they are likely to create more confusion than clarity”). 
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In sum, it would be disappointing were the push to define aggres-
sion to prematurely and hurriedly close our thinking about what, exactly, we 
hope to protect by criminalizing grave threats to transnational security, so-
vereignty, human rights, and stability interests.   
